~ Simone Bossi ~
Senior Security Consultant at Horizon Security
co-Founder at crypt.coffee
Since late 2015 I'm working as a Security Consultant at Horizon Security where I mainly carry out pentesting activities on mobile and web applications, networks, embedded and IoT devices, biometric authentication systems and so on.
In 2019 I graduated at the University of Milan, where I was part of the LaSER lab.
In 2015 I worked as a cryptanalyst at STMicroelectronics, a world leader multinational in semiconductor solutions, where I carried out research activities on communication security of IoT devices.
In 2014 toghether with a couple of classmates, I co-founded cryptcoffee and if you're an InfoSec addicted as I am, I suggest you to take a look..
I got my BSc in 2014 at the University of Milan, where I was part of the CLUB Laboratory.
2019 - Master of Science in Computer Science
Institute: University of Milan Final mark: 110/100L Thesis: Fuzzing OS Kernel Module Interface
University of Milan
Thesis: Fuzzing OS Kernel Module Interface
2014 - Bachelor of Science in Computer Science
Institute: University of Milan Final mark: 104/110 Thesis: Can a FDE solution provide security in the event that data is lost or stolen?
University of Milan
Thesis: Can a FDE solution provide security in the event that data is lost or stolen?
This paper provides an overview of the novelties introduced in TLS 1.3 draft finalized to improve security and latency of the protocol: the reworked handshake flows and the newly adopted cryptographic algorithms are analyzed and compared in terms of security and latency to the current TLS in use.
Full Disk Encryption (FDE) solutions might help users to protect sensitive data in the event that devices are lost or stolen. In this paper we focus on the security of Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) specifications, the most common FDE solution implemented in Linux based operating systems. In particular, we analyze the key management process used to compute and store the encryption key, and the solution adopted to mitigate the problem of brute force attacks based on weak user passwords. Our testing activities shows some weaknesses and user’s behavior that can significantly reduce the security of the main LUKS implementation, Cryptsetup.
This paper shows that, if HMAC-SHA-1 is computed in a standard mode without following the performance improvements described in the implementation note of RFC 2104 and FIPS 198-1, an attacker is able to avoid 50 % of PBKDF2’s CPU intensive operations, by replacing them with precomputed values. We note that a number of well-known and widely-used crypto libraries are subject to this vulnerability. In addition to such a vulnerability, we describe some other minor optimizations that an attacker can exploit to reduce even more the key derivation time.
Skul is a PoC to bruteforce the Cryptsetup implementation of Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS), I mainly wrote during my BSc thesis. Skul is now maintained by myself and my colleagues at cryptcoffee and it has been integrated into the BlackArch Linux Penetration Testing Distribution. Your can read more about it here or... Check it out!